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THE UNDISCOVERED COUNTRY: NORTHERN VIEWS OF 
THE DEFEATED SOUTH AND THE POLITICAL 
BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
by GARRETT Epps' 
In 1866, Harper's Weekly announced a new series of woodcuts of Southern 
life with the remark, "[t]o us the late Slave States seem almost like a newly-
discovered country.'" It is difficult for Americans in the Twenty-First Century, in a 
culture of cable news coverage and national newspapers, to appreciate just how 
mysterious the former Confederacy seemed to Northerners in the months after 
Appomattox. It was not simply that four years of war had made communication 
between the two halves of the nation difficult-though that was true, and both 
Northern and Southern society had changed during the searing years of war in ways 
that people in the other region could hardly imagine. More important was the brute 
historical fact that there had not been a nation before 186l. The North and South 
had always been separate societies, socially incompatible, culturally different, and 
mutually incomprehensible. Now, for the first time, the two halves were to become 
part of one whole, and Northerners found themselves wondering what their new 
countrymen were like, and how they planned to behave in the new nation forged by 
war. 
Throughout the second half of 1865, the states of the old Confederacy were 
aswarm with Northern visitors with notepads. They included no less a personage 
than Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, regarded by most Northerners as the 
greatest man of the age, and Carl Schurz, the legendary German-American leader 
who had been one of Lincoln's staunchest political allies.2 But there were others 
whose claims to attention arose solely because they were well-known journalists 
backed by the Northern press. And all had similar questions: How severe was the 
destruction visited on the former Rebel states? How did Southern people live? 
What money did they spend, what clothing did they wear, how did they travel, what 
did they eat? What were their feelings toward the North, and toward the Union 
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon. This article is adopted from chapter three of my 
forthcoming book, Second Founding: How the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment Transformed 
American Democracy. I thank the editors of the Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review for the 
opportunity to participate in their symposium on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and I thank 
all the other participants in the symposium for their stimulating ideas. I also thank, in particular, my 
research assistants, Kimberley Shore, Jacqueline Marks, Anne Mortland, and Emmett Soper; my 
University of Oregon colleagues Rennard Strickland, James O'Fallon, Keith Aoki, and Robert Tsai. The 
University of Oregon Law School supported my research on this project with a summer research grant 
from the Luvaas Faculty Fellowship Endowment Fund. My staff assistant, Debby Warren, worked hard 
on the project as well. Others who read and commented on an earlier draft, or who were otherwise 
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I. Our Artists in the South, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Apr. 28, \866, at 259. 
2. See generally HANS L. TREFOUSSE, CARL SCHURZ: A BIOGRAPHY vii (1982) (noting that 
Schurz impressed Lincoln in 1860 with his part in the success of the new Republican party by rallying 
German-Americans to the antislavery cause). 
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they had been forced to remain a part of? What were their plans for the four 
million Southerners of African descent, most of whom had, until the surrender, 
been held as slaves, persons without rights? And, perhaps most important for the 
anxious officials in Washington, what were their plans when they regained their 
place as full citizens of the United States? Would they accept that the war had 
changed the nation, and the Constitution, forever? Or would they seek to return to 
the place of mastery they had occupied before Fort Sumter-to become again the 
haughty Slave Power that anti-slavery Northerners had resented and feared for 
nearly half a century? 
The last question seems strange to us today. The South of late 1865 was a 
land devastated by war. The North had for decades been richer and more populous 
than the South. And yet, for half a century before the outbreak of war, many 
Northerners had hated, resented, and feared the South, and, more than that, had 
seen the Southern states and their political leaders as the real rulers of the United 
States. In the 1850s, anti-slavery politicians had begun to call the South, or at least 
the small slaveowning elite that ran it, the "Slave Power," a term that came to be as 
familiar in the years before the war as "intelligence community" or "military-
industrial complex" is today. For some, the "Slave Power" was a sinister 
conspiracy that pulled every string and manufactured every seeming coincidence in 
American life. John Smith Dye, a devoted conspiracy seeker, wrote three books 
during the 1850s and 60s explaining that the Slave Power had murdered President 
Zachary Taylor when he proved unresponsive to its wishes, and had poisoned the 
sugar at a Washington political gathering in 1857, nearly killing President James 
Buchanan and terrorizing him into slavish obedience to the Slave Power agenda.3 
But it wasn't just conspiracy theorists who saw the South as the uncrowned 
monarch of nineteenth century America during the years before Fort Sumter. As 
historian Leonard Richards notes: 
[T]he notion that a slaveholding oligarchy ran the country-and ran it for 
their own advantage-had wide support in the years before and after the 
Civil War. It was the basic theme that Abraham Lincoln and his fellow 
Republicans used in the 1850s to gain political power. Before that, it was 
deemed a self-evident truth by scores of prominent northerners. John 
Quincy Adams, former president of the United States, was a true 
believer. So were Charles Sumner, senator from Massachusetts; Salmon 
P. Chase, senator from Ohio; Josiah Quincy, president of Harvard; 
Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune; and Henry Wilson, 
future vice president of the United States. Oddly enough, many 
southerners also regarded the Slave Power thesis as a self-evident truth. 
Among the more prominent were Alexander Stephens, future vice 
president of the Confederacy, and the South Carolina Hotspur John 
3. Most accounts, then and now, suggest that the barrels of oysters served to the gathered politicos 
were the real cause of the outbreak of dysentery that affected the President. The probable cause was 
contamination in the kitchen. For a brief summary of Dye's theories, see LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE 
SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860, at 2 (2000). For an 
account of Buchanan's illness, see PHILIP SHRIVER KLEIN, PRESIDENT JAMES BUCHANAN: A 
BIOGRAPHY 268-69 (1962). 
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Henry Hammond.4 
Elsewhere, I have argued that a thorough understanding of the Slave Power 
thesis is an important key to understanding the thinking of the anti-slavery 
politicians who framed the Fourteenth Amendment. s The provisions of the 
Amendment track quite closely the concerns Northern Republicans had expressed 
about the Slave Power during the decade before Appomattox-about its political, 
legal and financial dominance of the Union, and about the undemocratic, internal 
political system that Southern States maintained, thereby ensuring that free-labor 
ideas would be forbidden and free-soil politicians excluded from power. 
Many more Northerners had fought to end the Slave Power than to end 
slavery-to put the haughty slavemasters who had ruled the Republic in its first 
century in their place and reform the political system so that the South could not 
dominate the federal government and use federal power against the free states. 
Now, like frightened villagers in a fairy tale, they were asking themselves if the 
giant could really be dead. Northern journalists, military officers, missionaries and 
teachers were the eyes and ears of the Northern public as they asked whether the 
Slave Power had learned its lesson. 
Four important American journalists had undertaken tours of the South in the 
months after the surrender, and all reported to the Northern public that the Slave 
South, though vanquished, was unbowed, and that its people intended to recreate its 
prewar system as closely as they could, and then to return to dominate the Union. 
The travel book was a stable of nineteenth century publishing-a vicarious 
chance for readers to journey to distant and exotic lands. And the South was as 
exotic to Northern readers as Ireland or Bohemia. One of the best sellers of the 
1850s had been Our Slave States, a trilogy of travel books by Frederick Law 
Olmsted, the journalist and landscape architect who is today best remembered as 
the designer of Central Park.6 In 1865, though, he was Associate Editor of a new 
magazine, The Nation.? Olmsted and the magazine's editor, E.L. Godkin, now 
commissioned a twenty-seven year-old Harvard graduate named John Richard 
Dennett to repeat Olmsted's travels and report to the magazine's readers under the 
weekly heading of "The South as It Is."8 Dennett was well prepared: he had taken 
time off from his studies at Harvard to work for a year in the Sea Islands of South 
Carolina, where Union troops in 1861 had seized plantations belonging to 
Southerner owners who had tled.9 The soldiers had begun the famous "Port Royal 
Experiment," in which the black slaves-who would not be legally freed for more 
4. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
5. See Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2004). 
6. See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Editor's Introduction to FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, THE 
COTTON KINGDOM: A SELECTION ix-Ivi (Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. ed., 1996) (1972) (recounting 
Olmsted's career and details of publication of original trilogy). 
7. See JOHN RICHARD DENNETT, THE SOUTH AS IT Is, 1865-1866, at vi (Henry M. Christman ed., 
Louisiana State Univ. Press 1965) (1866) (noting that Frederick Law Olmsted was a major sponsor of 
The Nation as well as the architect and writer for the magazine). 
8. Id. at vii-viii. 
9. Id. at vii. 
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than a year-were put to work under free-labor conditions and paid wages. \0 
Horace Greeley, the premier anti-slavery newspaperman of the North, 
commissioned another journalist, Whitelaw Reid, to travel south at about the same 
time. Dennett had to jostle over Southern railroads; Reid traveled in style down the 
coast in a military packet carrying Salmon P. Chase, Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, a veteran anti-slavery politician, former Secretary of the Treasury, and 
perennial presidential hopeful (he had actively schemed to displace Lincoln on the 
ticket in 1864)." Sidney Andrews reported on his own Southern travels for The 
Chicago Tribune (a Republican newspaper that jousted with Greeley's New York 
Tribune for the title of leading anti-slavery paper) and the even more deeply 
antislavery Boston Daily Advertiser.12 Andrews was a hardscrabble Midwestern 
journalist who had moved to Washington during the war and worked as a Senate 
attendant, filing savvy political reports as "Dixon," the name he used on his 
Southern travels as well. 13 Most prominent of the literary travelers was John 
Townsend Trowbridge, at thirty-eight already a well-known anti-slavery novelist 
and poet. Trowbridge had briefly served as editor of The Washington Sentinel, 
which was owned by Ben Perley Poore, the doyen of Washington correspondents. 
When the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 passed the Senate, Trowbridge had let fly 
with such a vicious editorial campaign against it that he had almost bankrupted the 
Sentinel. Poore had to return from his sabbatical, and Trowbridge had returned to 
Boston. The subscription publisher L. Stebbins now sent him south to prepare a 
travel volume for the spring list of 1866.14 
Taken together with Carl Schurz's report, the dispatches filed by these 
reporters tell us a good deal about life in the South during 1865 and early 1866-
the period in which the Thirty-Ninth Congress was reshaping the Constitution. 
Each writer had his own special concerns-Andrews was fascinated by the 
proceedings of the Southern conventions called by the newly appointed military 
governors; Dennett gave a picture more closely focused on day-to-day life; Reid 
chronicled many gatherings of prominent Southerners, who turned out to greet the 
Chief Justice, as well as many scenes between this most prominent of political 
abolitionists and the former slaves he had worked to free; and Trowbridge was 
more concerned with the picturesque than the others, and gave haunting glimpses 
of the desolate battlefields where the armies had fought just months before. 
But inevitably their accounts tell us as much, if not more, about what 
Northerners were thinking-and fearing-about their traditional foes. None of the 
correspondents provides an especially rich picture of life among the freed slaves. 
Like most Northerners of the time, they found black Americans exotic, and their 
patronizing attitudes seem to distort much of their reporting. But their real 
10. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE NEGRO IN 
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 158-60 (Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1995) (1964). 
11. WHITELAW REID, AFTER THE WAR: A SOUTHERN TOUR 10 (C. Vann Woodward ed., 1866). 
12. SIDNEY ANDREWS, THE SOUTH SINCE THE WAR i (William Loren Katz ed., Amo Press 1969) 
(1866). 
13. Id. at ii. 
14. JOHN T. TROWBRIDGE, THE DESOLATE SOUTH: 1865-1866, at iv (Gordon Carroll ed., Duell, 
Sloan & Pearce 1956) (1866). 
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curiosity was about white Southerners, about the haughty planters, politicians and 
merchants who had made up the Slave Power. And even though each man brought 
different experiences to bear on what he saw, and traveled different itineraries 
across the defeated South, their observations were remarkably consistent. They 
reported that the South, though defeated in battle, did not realize how much the war 
had changed America. 
On one level, Southerners owned their defeat. Andrews reported that one 
octogenarian delegate had told the South Carolina convention, "If the youngest of 
you lives to my age even, you will not see another musket shouldered in the South 
against the Union."'5 Everywhere they traveled, the reporters met former 
Confederate officials and soldiers who freely confessed their defeat and their 
weariness of war. 16 
But there were other fields of battle-politics, Congress, and the 
Constitution-and in those struggles the South expected nothing less than victory. 
Throughout the history of the Republic, Southerners had dominated the White 
House, the Supreme Court, and Capitol Hill. With the end of the fighting, 
Southerners saw no reason why they should not simply resume their traditional 
leading role. Slavery, as such, was abolished now. White Southerners admitted 
that-and thought that they were being liberal in doing so. But in all other 
respects, Southerners expected to be allowed to run their own states behind the 
shelter of "state sovereignty"-and to receive a bonus of federal political power for 
the oppressive and undemocratic features of their local institutions. 
The spirit of confidence was more striking because it came from a region so 
thoroughly devastated by war. Southern society had collapsed economically, Reid 
explained: 
Everything has been mended, and generally in the rudest style. Window-
glass has given way to thin boards .... Furniture is marred and broken, 
and none has been replaced for four years. Dishes are cemented in 
various styles and half the pitchers have tin handles. A complete set of 
crockery is never seen .... A set of forks with whole tines is a curiosity . 
. . . [H]ats, bonnets, and ladies' and children's shoes, are nearly all 
homemade. Hair-brushes and tooth-brushes have all worn out; combs are 
broken, and are not yet replaced; pins, needles, thread, and a thousand 
such articles, which seem indispensable to housekeeping, are very scarce. 
Even in weaving on the looms, com-cobs have been substituted for 
spindles. Few have pocket-knives. In fact, everything that has heretofore 
been an article of sale at the South is wanting now. At the tables of those 
who were once esteemed luxurious providers, you will find neither tea, 
coffee, sugar, nor spices of any kind. Even candles, in some cases, have 
been replaced by a cup of grease, in which a piece of cloth is plunged for 
a wick.17 
Northerners had not esteemed Southern cuisine even in flush times; now that 
15. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 95. 
16. /d. at 95. 
17. REID, supra note II, at 224. 
416 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:411 
most meals consisted of pork, lard and cornmeal, the region's diet seemed 
positively subhuman. By the time he reached Corinth, Mississippi, though, 
Trowbridge's culinary standards had sunk, so that he reported with satisfaction a 
particularly sumptuous repast of "fried pork, fricasseed gray squirrel (cold), boiled 
'back of hog' (warmed up), a pitcher of milk, cold biscuit, cold corn bread, and 
'sweet bread' (a name given to a plain sort of cake)."ls 
But most desperate of all was the Southern need of money-any form of it-
that could be spent for things they could not sew or shoot themselves. Confederate 
notes were valueless. In their place were only scant reserves of silver and gold. 
Most citizens had lent their hard money to the Confederate government in 
exchange for now-worthless paper. Now they were confronted with something 
Southerners had never seen before, because they had been unknown when the 
Union split asunder in 1861: national money, issued and backed by the Federal 
Treasury. Dennett found farmers and merchants in North Carolina who had never 
seen the new notes, which were ubiquitous throughout the North. 19 Those who 
would accept them insisted on a steep discount from prices set in silver or gold. 
From bitter experience with the Confederate government, most Southerners 
assumed the notes would be repudiated by the Union. "Won't be worth a copper in 
two years," one merchant assured the reporter.20 
Yet amid the poverty and destruction, there were signs of immediate growth. 
In the spring of 1865, Reid found Mobile "a city ofruins."21 Returning six months 
later, he rubbed his eyes in amazement at the sight of frantic rebuilding, as former 
Rebel soldiers thronged the bars to do business with Northern speculators.22 
Atlanta, burned by Sherman, presented an even more electric prospect when 
Andrews got there-"narrow and irregular and numerous streets are alive from 
morning till night with drays and carts and hand-barrows and wagons ... with a 
never-ending throng of pushing and crowding and scrambling and eager and 
excited and enterprising men, all bent on building and trading and swift fortune-
making."23 
But what Southern phoenix would rise from the ashes? Would it be a new 
democratic region of free labor and free speech, or the old South reborn, with its 
imperious planters, scheming politicians, docile voters and cowed blacks, slaves 
once again in all but name? To the visitors in 1865, the portents were ominous. 
The Republicans, victors in 1860 as in 1865, had always assumed that an end to 
slavery would raise to power a new class of anti-slavery Southerners, committed to 
the same values as their counterparts in the North. But this had been a 
miscalculation. "The theory of reorganization, which prevailed during the war, 
based itself upon the belief in the existence of a Union party at the South," Reid 
wrote.24 After his travels, he concluded, "[t]here was no such party."25 There were, 
18. TROWBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 166. 
19. DENNETT, supra note 7, at 147. 
20. fd. at 232. 
21. fd. at 402. 
22. fd. at 402-03. 
23. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 340. 
24. REID, supra note II, at 404. 
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to be sure, "Unionists" everywhere abroad in Dixie in 1865-but even for those 
who had adopted scalawag garb only after Appomattox, "Unionism" was 
insubstantial stuff, made up mostly of antagonism toward the planter class and 
liberally mixed with hatred and contempt of the freed slaves. "These men loved not 
the Union more," Reid reported, "but Jeff. Davis less."26 Andrews reported from 
North Carolina that "[m]uch of the 'Unionism' of the State is mere personal 
bitterness toward Jeff Davis, or Governor [Zebulon] Vance, or some less noted 
secession leader."27 Such Unionism, he concluded, was "a cheat, a will-o'-the-
wisp, and any man who trusts it will meet with overthrow."28 Most of these 
"Unionists" were so-called because they had opposed secession in 1861; but most 
of them had then "followed the state," assuming public office or military rank 
under the Confederacy. Southern whites who had refused to support the 
Confederacy had lived through four bitter years of isolation; and even in the wake 
of occupation, their lives were at best tenuous, and they reported constant danger 
from unrepentant Rebels. 
Yet, curiously, on most of the issues that concerned the Northern public in 
1865, the "Unionists" and the old Rebels were pretty much in agreement. Most 
importantly, most white political figures in the South agreed that, having lost the 
war, the Southern States were entitled by right to immediate re-entry into the 
Union, with little or no change in their constitutions or societies. The Constitution, 
as they had known it, guaranteed the sovereignty of every state, and made it in all 
but a few spheres superior to the federal government. The battles of the past four 
years had changed the military facts, Southern whites argued; they had not changed 
the Constitution or the power of the individual state. Visiting the Georgia state 
convention, Andrews reported, "[t]he State rights heresy was as dominant in this 
Convention, almost, as in [the secession convention] of 1861."29 Among the 
educated classes, there was "[n]ot merely a broad assertion of the rights of the 
States, but an open enunciation of the supremacy of the State over the general 
government .... "30 
Most Southerners were willing to admit that slavery was abolished, though 
they were often careful to add words like "by the military power of the United 
States" to indicate some question about the issue. The Thirteenth Amendment 
(which most Americans in 1865 called simply "the Amendment," because it was 
the only one adopted in their lifetimes) was not yet ratified, and many Southern 
whites told Carl Schurz that they would be willing to "accept" it-as long as it was 
rewritten to omit the section granting Congress the power to enforce its provisions, 
which they saw as compromising their state's prerogatives. 
Those prerogatives were absolute, they said, and Congress could do nothing to 
abridge them. Southerners intended to have their representatives in Congress right 
away, without any further "reconstruction." When Southern members reached 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. ANDREWS, supra note 12,at 184-85. 
28. /d. at 391. 
29. /d. at 283. 
30. /d. at 333. 
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Congress, one Georgian told Sidney Andrews, "We're not going there to ask 
favors, by G-D, but to demand our rights!"3l Another was more pacific, but no less 
firm, in his words to Whitelaw Reid: 
We tried to leave the Union. You have defeated us in our effort. What 
can there be, then, for us to do but to return our Senators and 
Representatives to the Congress from which we tried to withdraw 
forever? We acknowledge the defeat, and are ready to send back our 
Congressmen. That is what you have been fighting for; what more can 
the General Government have to do with the matter?32 
As for civil liberties, the privilege of voting, and the rights of the freed slaves, 
Southerners of all stripes agreed-these were internal matters, given over entirely 
to state government, about which a meddling Congress could have nothing 
whatsoever to say.33 
As far as many white Southerners were concerned, it was not just a matter of 
resuming their representation in Congress. The South, with its political unity and 
its lucrative cotton crop, had always dominated American politics, and expected to 
do so again. "We'll unite with the opposition up North, and between us we'll make 
a majority," one former federal officeholder told Whitelaw Reid. "Then we'll show 
you who's going to govern this country."34 
In fact, as far as many Southerners were concerned, the process of restoring 
regional rule had already begun. Andrew Johnson was a Southerner, and in the 
months since Appomattox he had abandoned the angry rhetoric about treason and 
set to work restoring the South to eminence. White Southerners hailed his efforts 
and expressed hearty support for him. In Georgia, politically savvy Southern men 
explained to Andrews that Johnson clearly had chosen the South as his base for a 
presidential run in 1868, and that "the South and the Democratic party could elect 
him then."35 Another Georgian explained that "[w]e must strike hands with the 
Democratic party of the North, and manage them as we always have .... [T]hey 
were ready enough to give us control if we gave them the offices; and I reckon 
they've not changed very much yet."36 Wade Hampton, a former secessionist 
firebrand and Confederate general, told the people of South Carolina that "it is our 
duty to support the President of the United States so long as he manifests a 
disposition to restore all our rights as a sovereign State."37 
Whitelaw Reid found that politically involved Mississippians expected 
Johnson to sweep away Republican opposition in Congress, by fair means or foul. 
"There's no use in you Yankees talking," one said.38 "Johnson can force through 
31. ld. at 320. 
32. REID, supra note II, at 264. 
33. ld. at 404. 
34. ld. 
35. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 233. 
36. ld. at 355. 
37. ld. at 391. 
38. REID, supra note II, at 393. 
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Congress anything he wants."39 Others suggested that Republican opposition might 
anger the President and lead him to a coup d'etat. "Hasn't he the army?" one group 
asked archly, while another was less subtle.40 "Johnson isn't going to put up with 
your radicals any longer. He is going to prorogue Congress at once, to get rid of its 
meddlesome interference with his policy!"41 
Dennett found much the same spirit in Vicksburg. "Johnson's doing very well 
now. He don't believe much in the niggers, neither, and when we're admitted into 
congress we're all right. The men that tYTannize over us now won't be in a 
majority then," one Southern pundit explained.42 "All the men, North and South, 
that are conservatives, must unite together. There are some men at the North that 
behaved very well all through the war, and we must unite with them."43 
Once they returned to authority, Southerners said, they would make a few 
changes in the postwar economic setup. To begin with, there was the issue of back 
taxes. Early in the war, Congress had approved a $20 million "direct tax" on the 
states.44 In the years before the income tax, peacetime federal revenue came almost 
exclusively from duties on imported goods. But when an emergency arose, the 
Union could simply demand cash from the states, assessed per capita on a basis of 
population. So the South's share of the 1861 levy was nearly $10 million-plus 
interest, of course.45 Southerners didn't think that was fair. And beyond that, there 
was the issue of the national debt. Ever since the rise of Andrew Jackson in 1828, 
low debt had been a watchword in American politics. But when Lincoln in 1861 
found himself with an empty treasury and half the Union in revolt, he and Treasury 
Secretary Chase had persuaded Congress to throw caution to the wind. By 1865, 
the national debt totaled $2.6 billion-nearly thirty times what it had been in 
1861-and required regular interest payments of $137 million a year. Federal 
taxation to payoff the Union debt was, Schurz reported with some restraint, "very 
unpopular in the South." One South Carolinian told Sidney Andrews that "the 
President would not require the south to pay any part of the national debt. 'What, 
ruin us, and then make us help pay the cost of our own whipping? I reckon not! "'46 
Indeed, the only question to many Southerners was whether the South should be 
exempted-or the entire national debt should simply be repudiated, like the 
Confederate debt after Appomattox. A tavern keeper in Southside, Virginia 
39. Id. 
40. !d.at318-19. 
41. Id. at 567. 
42. DENNETT, supra note 7, at 35l. 
43. !d. 
44. PHILLIP SHAW PALUDAN, A PEOPLE'S CONTEST: THE UNION AND CIVIL WAR, 1861-1865, at 
117 (Theodore A. Wilson ed., Univ. Press of Kansas 2d ed. 1996) (1988). 
45. IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
FINANCE, 1869-1879, at 16 (1964). 
Id. 
All told, the Lincoln government spent well over $3 billion for all purposes during the four 
years of conflict. Less than a fifth of this was paid for by taxes, leaving the federal debt at 
over $2.8 billion at its highest point in August 1865, when it equaled about one-half the 
annual gross national product. This was by far the largest debt the nation had ever 
experienced, and the interest on it alone far exceeded the total federal debt before 1861. 
46. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 219. 
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assured John Dennett that the Union bonds "were going to be repudiated in less 
than twelve months."47 In Georgia, a state convention delegate pointed out to 
Whitelaw Reid that it wasn't fair for Union bonds to be paid off while Confederate 
securities were worthless.48 "If that Confederate debt isn't honestly due no debt in 
the world ever was," he said.49 "If we've got to repudiate that, we may as well help 
the Democrats repudiate the debt on the other side too. What's fair for one is fair 
for the other. "50 
And the whole issue of Southern debts incurred to pay for the war would get 
another look once the South was back. The Northern travelers found few 
Southerners who were willing to argue for repayment of the $700 million debt run 
up by the Confederate States of America (CSA). The CSA had ceased to exist-its 
president, Jefferson Davis, was imprisoned in Fortress Monroe south of 
Richmond-and most Southerners had never felt much allegiance to the Richmond 
government. Most of the debt was owed to foreign investors, but the Confederate 
state governments also owed about $54 million. Much of that money had been 
borrowed from well-to-do whites in each state, and many of the leaders of the new 
state governments thought they ought to pay that money. True, it had been 
borrowed to fund a war against the Union, but few whites in the South thought the 
attempt at secession had been wrong or illegal, and the fact that the Union Army 
had defeated Lee's troops didn't change that. Andrew Johnson had suggested to the 
new governments that they repudiate that debt, and had found them remarkably 
reluctant to do so. Sidney Andrews found overwhelming majorities of the 
conventions in both South Carolina and Georgia in favor of requiring repayment of 
the state debts.51 When it became clear that even this president would not accept 
them back into the Union without repudiation, the conventions rather reluctantly 
assented-for the moment. One Georgia delegate pointed out that the issue could 
always be revisited: "Let us repudiate only under the lash and the application of 
military power, and then, as soon as we are in independent sovereignty, restored to 
our equal rights and privileges in the Union, let us immediately call another 
Convention and resume the debt."52 
Beyond the state debt, though, Southerners had another financial issue they 
expected the federal government to deal with. Lincoln's Emancipation 
Proclamation had freed the slaves. Now the South was ready to present its bill for 
this confiscation of valuable property. "There are abundant indications in 
newspaper articles, public speeches, and electioneering documents of candidates, 
which render it eminently probable that on the claim of compensation for their 
emancipated slaves the Southern States, as soon as readmitted to representation in 
Congress, will be almost a unit," Schurz told Johnson.53 "I 'low the gov'ment 
won't take away all our niggers for nothin' ," one North Carolinian explained to 
47. DENNElT, supra note 7, at 91. 
48. REID, supra note 11, at 357. 
49. Jd. 
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Andrews,54 "[t]he Cons'tution makes niggers prop'ty, and gov'ment is bound to 
pay for them."55 
Southerners were quite confident that their Congressional votes, coupled with 
those of Northern Democrats, would get them a good deal economically. 
Domestically, too, the restored union these Southern political thinkers envisioned 
would be much like the antebellum republic---complete with Southern control over 
words written and spoken in the South, the pervasive prewar censorship that 
historian Clement Eaton called "the intellectual blockade."56 The almost complete 
lack of free speech and debate in the old South had been one of the main criticisms 
offered by anti-slavery orators during the 1850s. As Reid noted, "[p]ersons writing 
from here in the spring of 1861, said there was no feature of the feeling among the 
leaders more marked than their scarcely disguised hostility to the freedom of the 
press."57 He found that feeling still general: "The newspapers found it difficult to 
realize that free speech and free press were at last established. The Montgomery 
Mail thought these correspondents from the North ought to be kept in their own 
section-they did nothing but misrepresent and slander."58 Schurz in his report 
reminded Johnson that: 
One of the greatest drawbacks under which the southern people are 
laboring is, that for fifty years they have been in no sympathetic 
communion with the progressive ideas of the times. While professing to 
be in favor of free trade, they adopted and forced a system of prohibition, 
as far as those ideas were concerned, which was in conflict with their 
cherished institution of slavery; and, as almost all the progressive ideas of 
our days were in conflict with slavery, the prohibition was sweeping .... 
This spirit, which for so long a time has kept the southern people back 
while the world besides was moving, is even at this moment still standing 
as a serious obstacle in the way of progress. 59 
This system of thought control seemed to mock the Constitution's promise 
that every state would be required to maintain a "republican form of government. "60 
Southern postmasters had barred Northern publications from the mail, and informal 
violence by individuals and secret "vigilance committees" had driven dissenting 
whites into silence or exile. Now those committees were reappearing. One 
Alabama Unionist showed Whitelaw Reid a note he had received: 
Sir: We, the undersigned citizens of Mobile, Ala., give you one week 
from date to leave the place, and if found within the limits of the city or 
State after the time specified as above, you and your traitorous offspring 
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56. CLEMONT EATON, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH 331 (1940). 
57. REID, supra note II, at 375. 
58. Id. 
59. CARL SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH 40-41 (William Loren Katz ed., 
Arno Press 1940) (1865). 
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
422 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 
will be wiped into eternity as sure as there is a God above you. 
By order of 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE.61 
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In New Orleans, Reid was told of a secret society that had made plans to drive 
all "Yankees" out of the city as soon as federal troops withdrew. And a planter in a 
rural Louisiana parish was subjected to another secret missive for the crime of 
leasing land to black farmers: "we have decided to bum more than your gin-house, 
and will kill you if you don't break up your infamous nigger camps."62 Dennett 
warned his readers that any Northerner emigrating South "would be compelled to 
restrict his accustomed freedom of speech and action and defer to the social and 
political theories and opinions of his neighbors."63 Sidney Andrews found that out 
personally, when rumors spread around Albany, Georgia, that this Yankee visitor 
had taken the side of a black man in a fistfight with a white. Andrews was tracked 
by a lynch mob, and had to be spirited out oftown.64 
Having been united so long on slavery, white Southerners were now, the 
correspondents reported, united in their fear and hatred of the freed slaves. It was, 
Sidney Andrews found, almost all they talked about: "Everybody talks about the 
negro, at all hours of the day, and under all circumstances .... Let conversation 
begin where it will, it ends with Sambo."65 Southerners "accepted" that Lincoln 
had freed the slaves-at least for the time being-but mere legal freedom did not 
make them citizens, it made them "free blacks," a tightly restricted legal status that 
had existed before the Civil War. With Emancipation, one Union officer told 
Schurz, the whites had concluded that "'the blacks at large belong to the whites at 
large. "'66 Andrews noted that even if Southern whites overtly "accepted" 
emancipation, almost none of them accepted that blacks were human beings, much 
less fellow citizens. "'The negro is an animal whose character the North seems 
utterly unable to comprehend,''' one South Carolina convention delegate told him.67 
That, he concluded, was the voice of Southern opinion: "the negro is an animal; a 
higher sort of animal, to be sure, than the dog or the horse, but, after all, an 
animal."68 
What that meant, to many Southerners, was that a legal system would have to 
be devised quickly to keep the "freed" slaves in their proper place-preferably on 
the plantations, laboring for their old masters. These "black codes," which were 
passed by many restored Southern legislatures in the fall of 1865, in essence made 
black Southerners wards of the state, granting officials authority to bind them out 
under contract to planters in need of hands. Blacks found wandering abroad 
without regular employment for a white master were subject to whipping, followed 
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by imprisonment. These "convicts" were then to be used for forced labor on public 
works, or leased to masters who would obtain their labor in exchange for paying off 
their fines. Black families were to be broken up again, as in slavery times, as 
well-a number of the "black codes" empowered local judges to seize the children 
of black parents and "apprentice" them to white masters. Preference, in some of 
the codes, was to go to the children's former owners.69 
Such harsh measures-slavery in all but name-shocked Northern readers. In 
late 1865, shortly before Congress assembled, Horace Greeley's New York Tribune 
ran a report on South Carolina's new "black codes" under the provocative headline, 
"SOUTH CAROLINA RE-ESTABLISHING SLAVERy'''70 But to many of the 
Southerners reporters talked to, the "black codes" were just a way station toward 
re-establishment of the old "peculiar institution" in all its glory. One man in 
Lynchburg told Dennett that the blacks "seem to think they be" free-but that "we 
can tell better when the next Congress meets and after the Supreme Court has 
decided."7l The reliance on the Supreme Court to give back their slaves was not as 
quixotic as it seemed-the Court had held in Dred Scott that black Americans were 
not and never could be citizens of the United States, no matter what Congress 
decided.72 Southerners had dominated the Court before the war, and the vast 
majority of Justices had been slaveowners and pro-slavery men. Southerners often 
spoke of Emancipation as a military measure. The Constitution had not yet been 
amended to bar slavery, and so the hope that they could win back in Congress or in 
court what they had lost in war was not completely absurd. 
Nevertheless, most educated Southerners understood that they were unlikely 
to get back the old system of individual chattel slavery. They were prepared, 
however, with a new system, which would use racially discriminatory statutes, debt 
peonage and the criminal courts to make blacks slaves of society in general. 
Schurz reported to Johnson that he had found throughout the old Confederacy "a 
desire to preserve slavery in its original form as much and as long as possible '" 
or to introduce into the new system that element of physical compulsion which 
would make the negro work."73 This "new system," he wrote, would not be 
"slavery in its old form," but instead a system "intermediate between slavery as it 
formerly existed in the South, and free labor as it exists in the North, but more 
nearly related to the former than the latter."74 
Many of the South's best brains were at work on how the new system could be 
smoothly installed. Andrews reprinted a speech by one Confederate veteran in 
Georgia, which explained that the new constitutional amendment allowed 
involuntary servitude as "punishment for crime."75 Thus, all that was needed was a 
69. See generally THEODORE BRANTER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965) 
(describing "black codes" and their relationship to the antebellum status of "free blacks"). 
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law that would "enable the judicial authorities ... to sell into bondage again those 
negroes who should be found guilty of certain crimes."76 Another Georgian veteran 
cheerfully told Andrews of "private talk" of making "the penal code take [the 
negro] back into the condition of slavery. It'll be called 'involuntary servitude for 
the punishment of crime,' but it won't differ much from slavery."77 In Selma, 
Alabama, Trowbridge found, city authorities were already putting such a system in 
place. He saw a chain gang of black men working on the streets; they had been 
convicted of '''using abusive language towards a white man, '" or of selling produce 
at the public market before the opening bell. 78 '''That's the beauty of freedom! '" 
onlookers told him as they pointed to the "criminals" at work.79 '''That's what free 
niggers come to! "'SO 
The whites of the South, all the reporters agreed, were uniformly convinced 
that only one thing could keep the region safe and solvent-the whip, the same 
mechanism that had preserved slavery so long. Hardly had Carl Schurz stepped 
aboard the Arago leaving Washington for Hilton Head when he met a Southern 
planter returning with a purpose of restoring his old lands.sl Schurz asked whether 
he expected to make contracts with his former slaves. 
This remark stirred him. He became animated .... Contracts with those 
niggers? It would never work. Yes, he had heard of that emancipation 
business. He knew that was the intention. But-and here he approached 
me with an air of confidentiality as if to coax my secret, true opinion out 
of me-now really did I think that this was a settled thing? Now, he 
could tell me that niggers would not work unless compelled to .... Why, 
was not President Johnson a Southern man, and did he not know equally 
well that the nigger would not work without compulsion?82 
This encounter set the pattern thereafter: "[I]n at least nineteen cases of 
twenty," he reported to Johnson, Southerners told him flatly, 
'You cannot make the negro work without physical compulsion.' I heard 
this hundreds of times, heard it wherever I went, heard it in nearly the 
same words from so many different persons, that at last I came to the 
conclusion that this is the prevailing sentiment among the southern 
people.83 
Reid found the same thing: "Nothing could overcome this rooted idea, that the 
negro was worthless, except under the lash," he wrote.84 Many of the "black 
codes" prescribed the whipping post for blacks who committed offenses that led 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 37 I. 
78. TROWBRIDGE, supra note 14, at 225. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
8 I. CARL SCHURZ, 3 REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ 159 (1908). 
82. Id. at 160. 
83. SCHURZ, supra note 59, at 16. 
84. REID, supra note 1 I, at 34. 
Spring 2004] THE DEFEATED SOUTH AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 425 
only to fines for whites. And even some officers stationed in the South--charged 
with protecting the "freed" slaves-assumed that regular whipping would be part of 
the system, and even sometimes volunteered to administer the lash themselves on 
behalf of "aggrieved" whites.85 
Indeed, Southern whites in 1865 and 1866 tended to agree that the whip was 
needed not only to make freed slaves work, but even to require them to behave in 
ordinary civil discourse. Whites regarded freed slaves as sullen, insolent and 
dangerous-often simply because the newly freed blacks resisted attempts by white 
to whip them. Whites tended to regard a whipping, or a beating, or even worse 
treatment as the prerogative of any white who was displeased by any black person, 
regardless of their previous relationship. Whitelaw Reid saw a Confederate veteran 
walk up to an armed black Union soldier:86 "Boy, le'me see your gun," the white 
man said casually, reaching for the soldier's weaponY When the black soldier 
refused, and raised his weapon to defend himself, the former Rebel walked away in 
genuine bewilderment, muttering, "'How the war has demoralized the cussed 
brutes! "'88 Another white told Sidney Andrews, "'I would shoot one just as soon as 
I would a dog. "'89 And, Andrews reported, he had seen a black man shot at in 
Columbia, South Carolina, at high noon in the doorway of a store, with no more 
notice taken than if the freed slave had been a domestic animal.90 
Feeling this way about their former slaves, white Southerners saw no reason 
why "freedom" for black people should carry any additional rights, such as the 
right to testify in court against whites.91 Most white Southerners regularly 
conceded that freedom brought a right to testify-but only against another black, 
they thought. "I found hardly any southern man that favored admitting black 
testimony in cases involving whites," Schurz reported, though some would agree to 
consider it as a price for full restoration to the Union.92 But allowing a black 
witness to contradict a white person, even under oath, was unthinkable, most whites 
agreed. '''Nothing would make me cut a nigger's throat from ear to ear so quick," a 
shoemaker told John Richard Dennett, "as having him set up his impudent face to 
tell that a thing wasn't so when I said it was so. The idea of letting one 0' them be 
sworn to give his evidence!"'93 
Not even many Northerners in 1865 favored extending the vote to blacks, 
either in the North or the South. Black Northerners could vote only in five states of 
old New England-and even there, Connecticut voters in November 1865 had 
roundly rejected black suffrage.94 Southerners took heart at the Connecticut vote, 
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and even more comfort from a reported remark of Andrew Johnson to the governor 
of Missouri-"This country is for white men, and by God, as long as I am 
President, it shall be a country for white men."95 After this was reported in the 
newspapers, one Mississippi paper adopted as its motto, "This is a white man's 
country-President Johnson."96 
To white Southerners then, votes for the freed slaves were simply beyond 
imagination. '''We don't believe that because the nigger is free he ought to be 
saucy, '" one South Carolinian-a proud self-proclaimed Unionist-told Whitelaw 
Reid, "'and we don't mean to have any such nonsense as letting him vote. He's 
helpless, and ignorant, and dependent, and the old masters will still control him. "'97 
Riding through the sugar-plantation country of Louisiana, John Richard Dennett 
met a new emigrant to the south, a Massachusetts-born white who made no secret 
of his hatred of slavery.98 The vote, however, was something different: 
[T]he men that advocated such a measure as that must be lunatics or fools 
.... The niggers were destitute of honesty; they didn't know the meaning 
of principles; they were ignorant and debased; and to put the ballot in the 
hands of such a set as the common plantation Negroes would be 
ruinous. 99 
Anyway, the Massachusetts man reminded Dennett, the vote was none of the 
Union's business.lOo Since 1789, the Constitution had allowed the states to decide 
who could vote and who could not. Some states allowed blacks to vote; others took 
the vote away from them in the early Nineteenth Century; some states, like New 
Jersey, had even let women vote-for a few decades after 1789, at least. 101 Nothing 
in the Constitution gave Congress any right to meddle in the Southern states' voting 
practices-and the general sense was that too many white people were voting, and 
that blacks were out of the question. Sidney Andrews found South Carolina leaders 
opposed even to white voting. "It will not do to put power in the hands of the 
common people," they told him. Others remarked sadly, "It was a great mistake 
when we passed our free-suffrage law."102 
The issue of black voting, however, seemed less important to Southern whites 
in 1865 than we might think. That is because many, if not most, whites expected 
the "freed slaves" to disappear, or die off, or be killed off, within a generation or 
two. Before the war, many anti-slavery Northerners had concluded that the only 
answer to the slavery question was colonization of freed slaves--either in Liberia, 
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or in Haiti, or in the American Southwest. Lincoln himself had pursued these 
strange-seeming colonization schemes even after issuing the Emancipation 
Proclamation in 1863.103 Now Southerners clutched at the idea that the federal 
government might simply deport the former slaves, leaving them free to cultivate 
their land with imported labor. Some spoke of bringing in Chinese, like those 
working in Western mining camps and railroads; others imagined that Europeans-
then thronging the cities of the North-would flock to the South as well, to pick 
cotton and live in former slave cabins. But free blacks had to go. In Virginia, a 
Congressional candidate proclaimed that, "I shall favor and encourage the 
emigration and colonization of the Negro population as a measure calculated, under 
present circumstances, to promote the interest of both races."l04 On a train between 
Knoxville, Tennessee, and Atlanta, Georgia, Whitelaw Reid met a former 
Confederate Major, who explained "that the only effective and satisfactory policy 
which could be adopted was that which General Jackson had pursued towards the 
Indians-they must be colonized."lo5 
A more sinister possibility was beginning to be whispered both North and 
South. Black people as a race were inferior to whites. That went without saying, 
and was assumed by all Southerners and most of their Northern visitors. The fate 
of the Indians showed white Americans what happened to racial inferiors when 
confronted with white civilization. They simply died off; and many whites 
expected-eagerly or perhaps sadly, depending on their underlying feelings-that 
the same would happen to the freed slaves. Emancipation, this theory ran, was a 
poisoned chalice; without protection and supervision, the "laws of nature" doomed 
black Americans to extinction. "I pity the poor niggers, after what you've done for 
them," said one Southerner whom John Townsend Trowbridge met literally outside 
Andrew Johnson's office door.106 "In a little while they'll be exterminated, just like 
the Indians. "107 Others affected less pity for the doomed race. "I candidly confess 
that I look forward to the extermination of the freedmen," a Pedee River planter 
told John Richard Dennett.108 Among some whites, the belief sprang from the new 
scientific notions spread by Charles Darwin, but for most, the belief in black 
extinction seemed to flow out of plain wishful thinking. Trowbridge reported 
passengers on a Southern train who spotted through the windows a ragged camp of 
freemen huddled against the cold around a fire. 109 "'That's freedom! That's what 
the Yankees have done for 'em!'" the white passengers began to cry with a grim 
satisfaction.110 "They'll all be dead before spring."lll What made the scene 
remarkable, he said, was that the same train was crowded with well-dressed blacks, 
traveling in groups to Memphis to buy Christmas presents. These passengers, who 
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showed no sign of imminent demise, were in a different car, however, and the 
white passengers affected not to see them. 112 
All in all, the prospects for the Union seemed to these Northern observers to 
be grim. If the South was restored on the basis Johnson proposed, the war itself 
might be lost even without another shot being fired. The prospect, Andrews 
reported, was for "a sullen and relentless antagonism to the idea of national 
sovereignty,-from which will breed passionate devotion to local interests, 
unending persecution of the freedmen, never-ceasing clamor in behalf of State 
rights, and continual effort to break away from the solemn obligations of the 
national debt."I13 Schurz warned that there was a possibility that the South would 
"build up another 'peculiar institution' whose spirit is in conflict with the 
fundamental principles of our political system."114 Trowbridge warned that 
Southern leadership was determined 
to govern not only their own states but to regain their forfeited leadership 
in the affairs of the nation; to effect the repudiation of the national debt or 
to get the Confederate debt and the Rebel state debts assumed by the 
whole country; to secure payment for their slaves, and for all injuries and 
losses occasioned by the war .... They consider it hard that, at the end of 
the bloodiest civil war that ever shook the planet, they cannot quietly slip 
back in their places and take up once more the scepter of political 
power. ll5 
The picture of the re-emerging Slave Power was remarkably consistent among 
all the accounts. Of course, all were written by Northern partisans, who could be 
expected to sympathize with the Republican Party. But in case anyone was in 
doubt about the message, the Richmond Examiner ran a short report on the political 
situation in January 1866. No one could accuse the Examiner of Northern bias; it 
had been a consistent voice for secession and violence since before Sumter. Once, 
when Robert E. Lee suggested offering black men freedom if they would fight for 
the Confederacy, the Examiner had questioned the loyalty of the South's leading 
general. I16 Now Pollard's paper announced for all to read: 
Universal assent appears to be given to the proposition that if the States 
lately rebellious be restored to rights of representation according to the 
federal basis, or to the basis of numbers enlarged by the enumeration of 
all the blacks in the next census, the political power of the country will 
pass into the hands of the South, aided, as it will be, by Northern 
alliances. The South claims that this will be the fact, and the North does 
not dispute it. 117 
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